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ABSTRACT
Normalization of deviance has been thoroughly studied and proven to have a 
dramatic impact on the medical industry, particularly in the field of anesthesiology, and 
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Few such studies have 
been conducted in the mining industry. This research was designed to show whether 
normalization of deviance is occurring within the subculture of mining engineers. 
This research project was based on a cross-sectional surveillance of a group of 
mining engineers and consultants belonging to the Society for Mining, Metallurgy and 
Exploration (SME).  
There were three hypotheses for this research: 1) there is a correlation between 
ethics, compensation, risk tolerance, and normalization of deviance; 2) there are either 
positive or negative associations between each of the independent variables—ethics, 
compensation, and risk tolerance—to the dependent variable—normalization of deviance; 
3) the data would make it possible to predict normalization of deviance among mining
engineers. All three hypotheses were proven true in this study. 
This research is important because it shows that normalization of deviance exists 
among mining engineers.  
4 
I dedicate this research to all those who have lost their lives in mining incidents and their 
surviving family members, for their courage. It is my hope that their great loss will help 
the rest of us solidify our own resolve to increase mining safety. 
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Mining is a high-risk profession. Those who work in this industry accept, and are 
comfortable with, the high levels of risk. Like other high-risk professions, mining is not 
exempt from having errors that can lead to fatalities, injuries, and lost production time. 
These situations are called incidents, rather than accidents, by the health and safety 
personnel, because all incidents are preventable (Darling 2011). Incidents are caused by 
unintentional or intentional human error. When human errors involve cutting corners or 
taking shortcuts to complete a given task, it is called normalization of deviance. 
Normalization of deviance may have a negative effect on mine design and modifications 
to mine design among other things. In 2016, at the Society for Mining, Metallurgy and 
Exploration (SME) annual conference, Steve Gardner, president of SME, publically 
recognized that normalization of deviance is occurring in the mining industry (Gardner 
2016). 
The integration of safety systems, leadership, and culture is essential to dealing 
with the rising problem of normalization of deviance. This research focused on 
normalization of deviance in the sub-culture of mining engineers within the mining 
culture. 
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There are external and internal factors that may influence a mining engineer's 
actions that could allow for the prediction of normalization of deviance. External factors 
include regulations, performance standards, mineral assets, and other guidelines 
determined by the company. The internal factors are those of morality or a moral code by 
which the mining engineer lives.  
There are two aspects of the moral code: one is personal while the other is 
professional. The personal aspect includes the engineer’s ethics, risk tolerance, 
experience, and situational awareness. Professional factors include education, work 
ethics, certifications, working experience, and financial rewards for increased production 
(compensation). This research will take ethics, compensation, and risk tolerance and test 
each of these factors to see if they relate positively or negatively to normalization of 
deviance.  
1.2 Objectives 
This research will attempt to correlate and determine associations between three 
of these factors (ethics, compensation, and risk tolerance) and normalization of deviance. 
There are three primary objectives. The first objective is to determine if there is a 
correlation between ethics, compensation, risk tolerance, and normalization of deviance. 
The second objective is to determine an association between each of the independent 
variables—ethics, compensation, and risk tolerance—to the dependent variable—
normalization of deviance. The third objective is to determine if there are any unique 




2.1 Systematic Desensitization 
Based on “an ever-growing body of experimental evidence … it is becoming 
strikingly clear that systematic desensitization is a highly effective procedure for the 
reduction of [irrational] fears and phobias” (Goldfried 1971). “[Systematic] 
desensitization was developed by Joseph Wolpe in the early 1950s. He arrived at this 
method, which may be described as a gradual deconditioning of anxiety responses” 
(Rachman 1967). Systematic desensitization helps people in a controlled environment to 
overcome their fears or phobias. This “same process seems to occur in the natural 
environment, and it works against us with regard to safe work habits” (McSween 2003). 
McSween continues with an example of a person who has a fear of heights, but whose 
job requires working at heights. In the beginning, fall protection is always worn, but after 
a time of working in this environment, the person may have a higher risk tolerance of 
heights and thus be less likely to wear fall protection. 
2.1.1 Risk Homeostasis 
“Risk homeostasis theory [RHT] posits that people at any moment of time 
compare the amount of risk they perceive with their target level of risk and will adjust 
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their behavior in an attempt to eliminate any discrepancies between the two” (Wilde 
1998). Wilde explains that in 1967, Sweden switched the side of the road on which traffic 
passed. After the switch, Sweden experienced a decline in incident rates, which continued 
for about a year and a half. Thereafter incident rates returned to their previous levels, 
illustrating the idea that without external input, systematic desensitization occurs. In this 
case, people overcame their fear of driving on the “other side” of the road and with their 
comfort came an increase of incidents. 
Similarly, a mining company may expect to see the same trends when 
implementing new safety plans or programs to make the mine a safer place. When new 
rules or regulations are introduced, the mine will most likely see a decrease in incidents. 
However, after time, the incident rate will begin to increase and return to what it was 
before the implementation of the new rules. If behavior-based safety is not included in 
the safety system, then after the establishment of the safety system, “the results will 
basically be normal variation above and below the industry average: some years better 
than average, some worse” (McSween 2003). In other words, risk homeostasis will 
continue to occur in the mining industry. 
2.2 Behavior-Based Safety 
Behavior-based safety was created to combat the phenomenon known as 
systematic desensitization (McSween 2003). “A number of recent books detail the 
principles and procedures of behavior-based safety, and they provide solid evidence for 
the success of this approach to injury prevention” (Geller 1996a, 1998a, 1998d; Krause 
1995; Krause et al. 1996; McSween 1995; Sulzer-Azaroff 1998, as cited in Geller et al. 
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2001). The acronym “DO IT” introduces the steps of the behavior-based safety process, 
which is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
The first step is to define the target behavior, which is an at-risk behavior that 
should be avoided or a safe behavior that should be strengthened. The second step is to 
observe. Through observations, coworkers or management can better understand the 
antecedents and consequences of the target behavior. It is important to remember that the 
observations are fact-finding and not fault-finding. The third step is intervention. An 
effective intervention can be designed and implemented only if the proper observation 
occurs. There are three different types of intervention strategies: instructional, supportive, 
and motivational. The final step is to test. This stage is where the intervention is tried, 
refined, or replaced. The “DO IT” process is the responsibility of the miners, supervisors, 
and management.  
2.3 Culture 
Culture is a broad term that is used to describe the way a group of people thinks 
and behaves. Therefore, a safety culture is the way a group of people think and behave 
towards safety. Like many other high-risk industries, the U.S. mining industry has set 
forth rules and procedures to ensure compliance with the laws and safety regulations that 
have been established by the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). 
Many mining companies have embraced such programs as “informal feedback on 
complying with safety procedures, safety meetings and training, safety awards, safety 
audits, written procedures, and special initiatives” (McSween 2003). But safety is still a 
problem. 
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The issue is not whether the rules are practical or not, or whether the rules 
should be simply followed or not. A more serious issue is that possibly the 
large majority of employees (including deputies/supervisors) operate 
dangerous machinery every day in underground mines with a basic 
disposition that safety rules are ‘irrelevant, superfluous, non-essential or 
excessive.’ If this is the case, an important resource for limiting the risky 
behavior of employees is critically deficient. (Pitzer 2000, as cited in 
Laurence 2011) 
The disposition that Pitzer mentions, which consists of the same attitudes that lead to 
systematic desensitization and risk homeostasis, is the reason why mining companies are 
incorporating behavior-based safety into their safety systems.  
2.4 Mining Engineering and Design 
The definition of engineering is “the practical study of how to make people and 
things work better together” (Davis 1998). The SME Mining Engineering Handbook 
provides instruction for a variety of tasks that a mining engineer may be required to 




• Management and Administration
• Mining Method Selection
• Rock Breaking Methods
• Ground Mechanics
• Infrastructure and Services
• Surface Extraction




• Health and Safety
• Environmental Issues
• Community and Social Issues
(Darling 2011) 
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A mining engineer may work in one of the areas mentioned above, or may be responsible 
for many of the given areas. In any case, it is the mining engineer’s responsibility to 
maximize production “as safe as reasonably possible.” The word “reasonably” may be 
interpreted in many ways. Therefore, these factors—ethics, compensation, risk tolerance, 
and normalization of deviance—will strongly influence how mining companies, mines, 
and mining engineers incorporate safety into the mine design, modifications of mine 
design, and the operation of a mine.  
2.5 Compensation 
Leonard states that companies will often offer bonuses to reach certain goals. 
“Firms implementing bonus systems have significantly higher performance . . . than firms 
without bonus systems” (Leonard 1990, as cited in Bloom and Milkovich 1995). 
However, it has been shown that pay incentives can change how employees view risk in 
the workplace. Milkovich states that “firms relied on incentive pay to align employee 
actions with critical organizational performance objectives” (Milkovich et al. 1991, as 
cited in Bloom and Milkovich 1995). Mining companies often offer bonuses to their 
employees for either reaching a certain production criterion or for achieving a certain 
number of days without a lost-time incident. When safety rules and regulations are 
ignored to reach the production quota or when incidents go unreported so that everyone 




Professions that require trust—physicians, attorneys, law enforcement, and the 
military—are governed by sworn oaths. The oaths for the professions listed are, 
respectively, the Hippocratic Oath (North 2002), Attorney’s Oath (Preamble 2016), Law 
Enforcement Oath (ICAP 2016), and Oath of Enlistment (U.S. Army Center of Military 
History 2016); these oaths enumerate the responsibilities and ethical codes that those 
entering these professions swear to uphold. Engineers are responsible for designs that 
directly affect the lives of many people. However, engineers in general are not required to 
take an oath or swear to uphold any ethical codes upon entering the workforce. 
The licensing procedures for most professions, such as physicians (USMLE 2016; 
COMLEX-USA 2016) and attorneys (Gillen 2016), include an ethical component. The 
licensing procedure for professional engineers (PE) does not include an ethical 
component (NCEES 2017; Civil Engineering Academy 2017). 
2.7 Risk Tolerance and Acceptable Risk 
The terms “risk tolerance” and “acceptable risk” can be used interchangeably; 
however, there is a difference between the two. The definition of acceptable risk is a 
“level of human and/or material injury or loss from an industrial process that is 
considered to be tolerable by a society or authorities in view of the social, political, and 
economic cost-benefit analysis” (businessdictionary.com 2015). The Health and Safety 
Executive of the United Kingdom (HSE) has defined risk tolerance by stating, “To 
tolerate a risk means that we do not regard it as negligible or something we might ignore, 
but rather as something we need to keep under review and reduce still further if and when 
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we can” (Stone 1988, as cited in Melchers 2001). The main difference between the two 
definitions is scope. For example, in mining, risk tolerance is understood on a large scale, 
as the community’s, city’s, or state’s views of risk and how much will be tolerated. In 
contrast, acceptable risk is considered on a more local scale, and may be understood 
differently from one mine site to another. 
2.7.1 Risk Perception 
Paul Slovic and Ellen Peters explain that people will perceive risk in two 
fundamental ways: risk as feelings and risk as analysis. “Risk as feelings refers to our 
instinctive and intuitive reactions to danger. Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and 
scientific deliberation to bear on risk assessment and decision making” (Slovic and Peters 
2006).  
Humans will make decisions based on their “gut feelings” or “intuition.” These 
sensations develop through positive experiences gained by using one’s emotions to make 
decisions. However, feelings can also be swayed by beliefs, and social and cultural 
influences. Paul Slovic, in 1987, ranked and listed many risks based on people’s 
perceptions of those risks; see Figure 2.2.  
Displayed at the bottom of Figure 2.2 is a list of 18 risk characteristics. These 
characteristics determine how risks are plotted on the figure above. Each hazard is unique 
in the effect it has on the population as a whole. It is determined by the combined 
influence of risk (how well the risk is known or understood) and dread (how serious the 
consequences of the risk are perceived to be). For example, if a person falls off a bicycle 
and is injured, there will be no significant impact on how other people view risk as it 
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pertains to bicycles. However, a non-fatal incident with a nuclear reactor will change how 
people perceive the risk of nuclear activities. This perception of nuclear activities occurs 
when the hazard has a high dread factor and a low risk tolerance.    
2.7.2 Financial Risk 
Mining is considered a high-litigation-risk industry (Hogan and Jeter 1999). The 
definition of litigation risk is “the possibility that legal action will be taken because of an 
individual's or corporation's actions, inactions, products, services or other events” 
(Investopedia 2016). To minimize negative legal action, the design of the mine is critical. 
Not only is mining considered a high-litigation-risk activity, but it also presents 
financial and unique risks. The financial risk of mining may include unexpected changes 
in the price of the commodity of interest or cost of extraction. Mining risks are unique 
because “mining is dynamic, diverse, highly scalable, proximity, three-dimensional, and 
there is an imperfect understanding of major hazards” (Hethmon forthcoming). 
Litigation, financial, and mining risks drastically and unpredictably threaten mines. 
Therefore, it is the responsibility of the mining engineer to understand and mitigate the 
different types of risk that occur throughout the life of the mine in response to changing 
risks or perception of risks. 
2.8 Normalization of Deviance 
Jeffrey Pinto states that normalization of deviance is “the gradual process through 
which unacceptable project management practices or standards have become acceptable. 
As this behavior is repeated without catastrophic results, it has become the social or 
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operating norm of your project group or organization” (Pinto 2014). The difference 
between systematic desensitization and normalization of deviance is scope. Systematic 
desensitization occurs on a personal level, while when normalization of deviance occurs, 
it affects the entire organization. The medical industry, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), oil industry, and mining industry each demonstrate cases of 
normalization of deviance, which will be described below. 
2.8.1 Medicine 
The last 15 years have seen an “increased emphasis on economic productivity, 
driven in part by concern about the endlessly increasing health care costs” (Prielipp et al. 
2010). Because of this increased concern, the prevailing philosophy has become “doing 
more with less.” There are three examples in the field of anesthesiology where “doing 
more with less” has led to normalization of deviance. In the first example, standard 
anesthesia monitors are disconnected before the end of the general endotracheal 
anesthesia. It is believed that by removing the monitors prematurely, the job is being 
completed more quickly and efficiently. However, “Nothing in the American Society of 
Anesthesiologist’s (ASA) or the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists’ guidelines 
supports such practice” (Prielipp et al. 2010). The second example is the lack of 
determining a neuromuscular response baseline before administering general anesthesia. 
In the transition from the long-acting drugs to the intermediate-acting drugs, it was 
thought that postoperative residual paralysis would no longer occur. Because of this, the 
medical personnel deviated from basic neuromuscular monitoring in favor of completing 
the process more quickly. The third example involves the performance of peripheral 
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nerve blocks (PNB). Throughout this procedure, the anesthesiologist will use a pulse 
oximeter monitor. When using the pulse oximeter monitor, it is preferable to use four 
complementary monitors: ultrasound, nerve stimulation, injection pressure, and 
cardiorespiratory (Gadsden 2013; Gadsden, McCally, and Hadzic 2010). Because of 
production and economic pressure, anesthesiologists and staff have taken shortcuts or 
have deviated from proper procedures to save time and money (Prielipp et al. 2010). 
2.8.2 NASA 
While NASA was first formed in 1958, the space-shuttle era started in 1981 and 
lasted until 2011. During those 30 years, NASA launched 135 missions and had two 
disasters, Challenger and Columbia (NASA 2015). These two disasters demonstrate the 
normalization of deviance in NASA’s upper management.  
2.8.2.1 Challenger 
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds after lift-
off. The cause of the explosion was failure of the O-rings in the solid rocket booster 
(SRB). The classification of O-rings changed to “Criticality 1” in 1982, indicating that 
failure of these components would cause the entire rocket to fail (Abramson 1986). When 
the O-rings were reclassified, some in NASA were concerned that defective O-rings 
could delay or halt future launches.  It was thus decided that, until the issue was solved, 
secondary seals would be installed as an added level of protection and trips to space 
would continue uninterrupted. After the Challenger explosion, NASA stated that it was 
aware that lower temperatures could cause the primary O-ring to fail; however, because 
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of multiple successful launches over the intervening years, NASA considered the failure 
of the primary O-rings an acceptable risk. 
2.8.2.2 Columbia 
The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in 
the Thermal Protection System [TPS] on the leading edge of the left wing. 
The breach was initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from 
the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and struck the wing in the 
vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel 8 at 81.9 
seconds after launch. (NASA 2003) 
At the time of the Columbia disaster, NASA classified incidents as “In-Family” or 
“Out-of-Family.” “In-Family” classification received less attention than the “Out-of-
Family” classification. In the Challenger disaster, the classification of the TPS risk was 
downgraded from “Out-of-Family” to “In-Family.” Even before shuttles began 
launching, management knew about the fragility of the TPS tiles. It was normal to replace 
and repair TPS materials, and, because there had been other launches in which foam 
debris fell from the shuttle without incident, management downgraded the importance of 
the risk.  
2.8.3 Oil Industry 
“In 2015, the United States consumed a total of 7.08 billion barrels of petroleum 
products, an average of about 19.4 million barrels per day” (EIA 2016). The contribution 
of the British company BP for the same year was 3.3 million barrels of oil per day (BP 
2015), about 17% of the total oil consumed per day. In 2005, BP’s Texas refinery 
exploded. Normalization of deviance may not have been the root cause; however, it did 
play a role in the disaster, as will be shown below.  
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2.8.3.1 BP Texas City 
Fifteen died and another 180 were injured in the BP Texas City Refinery disaster 
that occurred on March 23, 2005. During the start-up of the tower in the refinery’s 
isomerization unit, flammable liquid hydrocarbons were pumped into the tower for three 
hours and no liquid was removed. The alarm system failed to activate, so personnel were 
not alerted of the high level of liquid in the tower. The pressure relief valves did work, 
emptying the flammable liquid into the blowdown drum and stack. However, the 
blowdown system was old and lacked a flare to burn off the combustible vapor that 
accumulated. This vapor cloud reached the ground and was ignited, probably by a diesel 
pickup truck that was idling nearby (Merritt et al. 2005).  
BP’s investigation report listed nine key organizational findings in relation to the 
accident, as listed below:  
1. Cost-cutting, failure to invest and production pressures from BP Group
executive managers impaired process safety performance at Texas
City.
2. The BP Board of Directors did not provide effective oversight of BP’s
safety culture and major accident prevention programs. The Board did
not have a member responsible for assessing and verifying the
performance of BP’s major accident hazard prevention programs.
3. Reliance on the low personal injury rate at Texas City as a safety
indicator failed to provide a true picture of process safety performance
and the health of the safety culture.
4. Deficiencies in BP’s mechanical integrity program resulted in the “run
to failure” of process equipment at Texas City.
5. A “check the box” mentality was prevalent at Texas City, where
personnel completed paperwork and checked off on safety policy and
procedural requirements even when those requirements had not been
met.
6. BP Texas City lacked a reporting and learning culture. Personnel were
not encouraged to report safety problems and some feared retaliation
for doing so. The lessons from incidents and near-misses, therefore,
were generally not captured or acted upon. Important relevant safety
lessons from a British government investigation of incidents at BP’s
Grangemouth, Scotland, refinery were also not incorporated at Texas
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City. 
7. Safety campaigns, goals, and rewards focused on improving personal
safety metrics and worker behaviors rather than on process safety and
management safety systems. While compliance with many safety
policies and procedures was deficient at all levels of the refinery,
Texas City managers did not lead by example regarding safety.
8. Numerous surveys, studies, and audits identified deep-seated safety
problems at Texas City, but the response of BP managers at all levels
was typically ‘too little, too late.’
9. BP Texas City did not effectively assess changes involving people,
policies, or the organization that could impact process safety.
(Merritt et al. 2005) 
Each of these nine organizational findings shows that at the time of the disaster, 
management had deviated from the rules and regulations that were in place to achieve 
higher production numbers and increased financial gains.  
2.8.4 Mining Industry 
Congress passed the first statute governing mine safety in 1891, prohibiting 
children under age 12 from working in mining and setting forth basic requirements for 
ventilation. It wasn’t until 1977 that Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act (Mine Act), in which the rights of miners were strengthened and enhanced. The Mine 
Act also mandated that “all federal health and safety regulations of the mining industry 
were consolidated under a single department Mine Safety and Health Administration” 
(MSHA 2016).  
The scope of this research was limited to the United States. Therefore, the 
disasters described below are those that occurred most recently in the United States. In 
both cases, management deviated from the rules and regulations that MSHA had set forth 
for mining companies. 
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2.8.4.1 Crandall Canyon, Utah 
In August 2007, “a catastrophic coal outburst accident occurred during pillar 
recovery in the South Barrier . . . within seconds, overstressed pillars failed throughout 
the South Barrier section” (Gates et al. 2007). This pillar failure caused the death of six 
miners. During the rescue, there was another coal burst, which overwhelmed the ground 
support system and killed another three people.   
At the time of the incident, Genwall Resources, Inc. (GRI), a subsidiary of 
Murray Energy Corp., operated the mine. Before the incident, GRI had hired a consulting 
firm, Agapito Associates, Inc. (AAI), to conduct engineering analyses for the mine. 
Enforcement actions were issued to both GRI and AAI for the disaster. “Murray Energy 
Corp. agreed to pay $950,000 in civil penalties” (Gorrell 2013). GRI plead guilty to two 
criminal misdemeanors and was fined $500,000. AAI settled, and agreed to pay $100,000 
for a high-negligence violation (Gorrell 2013). 
In the investigation of the disaster, AAI showed seven signs of normalization of 
deviance. First, AAI had many years of experience working with this mine and was 
familiar with the mining conditions. Despite, or perhaps because of, having this 
information, AAI conducted engineering analyses that were flawed. Second, AAI did not 
consider the barrier pillar stability in any of its analyses. Third, AAI recommended a 
pillar design that had a lower calculated pillar stability factor than was recommended by 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Fourth, AAI did not 
verify ground conditions that caused unreliable calibration of the model parameters. 
Fifth, AAI did not use realistic mining conditions when modeling the pillars. Instead, it 
assumed that the pillar cores would never fail regardless of load. Sixth, AAI management 
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did not review input or output files for accuracy and completeness. Seventh, AAI mine 
designs did not account for ground stability or the ventilation system (Gates et al. 2007). 
GRI and its management also showed four specific signs of normalization of 
deviance: First, GRI regularly used bottom mining methods, even though AAI’s mine 
designs did not address this type of mining. Second, GRI did not report to MSHA about 
the three coal bursts that occurred a week before the disaster. If these had been reported, 
MSHA would have been able to properly investigate the incidents and enforce corrective 
actions (Crandall Canyon Investigation). Third, GRI didn’t revise their mining plan after 
the three coal bursts. Fourth, GRI accepted the risks of ground movement and air blasts 
that frequently destroyed ventilation controls. By following the rules and regulations 
concerning design, bursts, and ventilation, GRI could have avoided this disaster.   
2.8.4.2 Upper Big Branch, West Virginia  
In April 2010, a massive coal dust explosion occurred at the Upper Big Branch 
(UBB) mine, injuring two and killing 29 miners. At the time of the disaster, UBB was 
operated by Performance Coal Company (PCC), a subsidiary of Massey Energy. The 
following discussion shows that normalization of deviance was present in the 
management of PCC/Massey.  
The physical conditions that led to the explosion were the result of a series 
of basic safety violations at UBB and were entirely preventable. 
PCC/Massey disregarded the resulting hazards. While violations of 
particular safety standards led to the conditions that caused the explosion, 
the unlawful policies and practices implemented by PCC/Massey were the 
root cause of this tragedy. The evidence accumulated during the 
investigation demonstrates that PCC/Massey promoted and enforced a 
workplace culture that valued production over safety, including practices 
calculated to allow it to conduct mining operations in violation of the law. 
The investigation also revealed multiple examples of systematic, 
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intentional, and aggressive efforts by PCC/Massey to avoid compliance 
with safety and health standards, and to thwart detection of that non-
compliance by federal and state regulators. (Page et al. 2010) 
The investigation of this disaster found that PCC/Massey willfully and blatantly deviated 
from the rules and regulations set forth by MSHA. The investigation found that 
PCC/Massey’s only focus was production.    
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Source: Adapted from http://www.scielo.br/img/revistas/sausoc/v19n4/02f02.jpg 
Figure 2.2 Activities Ranked by Risk 
CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESIS 
3.1 First Hypothesis 
The engineer’s view of risks is critical to the design of a mine. The first 
hypothesis tests the correlation between mining engineers’ personal perceptions—ethics, 
compensation, and risk tolerance—with normalization of deviance. 
H1: There is a correlation between ethics, compensation, risk tolerance, and 
normalization of deviance. 
3.2 Second Hypothesis 
The second hypothesis asks if there is evidence supporting the first hypothesis, 
are there any associations between the engineers’ personal perceptions and normalization 
of deviance.  
H2a: There is a negative association between ethical behavior and normalization 
of deviance. 
H2b: There is a positive association between compensation and normalization of 
deviance.  
H2c: There is a positive association between risk tolerance and normalization of 
deviance. 
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3.3 Third Hypothesis 
The third hypothesis asks if, when there is evidence supporting associations 
between the engineer’s personal perceptions and normalization of deviance, are any of 
those associations unique associations? 
H3a: Ethics is significantly, uniquely associated with and accounts for additional 
unique variance in normalization of deviance. 
H3b: Compensation is significantly, uniquely associated with and accounts for 
additional unique variance in normalization of deviance. 
H3c: Risk tolerance is significantly, uniquely associated with and accounts for 
additional unique variance in normalization of deviance. 
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Sample Size 
It is important in a survey that the sample size is large enough for the survey to 
have significant statistical power. “Statistical power describes the probability that a test 
will correctly identify a genuine effect” (Ellis 2010). The rule-of-thumb for calculating 
sample size is N ³ 50 + 8(m) (Green 1991) where 50 is the lowest number of participants 
allowed, and “m” is the number of variables in the study. This study examined three 
different independent variables; therefore, the sample size needed was at least 74 
participants.  
However, Ellis (2010) states that to run a proper power analysis, four parameters 
are essential: 
The effect size, the sample size, the alpha significance criterion, and the 
power of the statistical test.  
1. The effect size [f2] describes the degree to which the phenomenon is
present in the population and therefore “the degree to which the 
null hypothesis is false” (Cohen 1988, as cited in Ellis 2010).  
2. The sample size or number of observations (N) determines the
amount of sampling error inherent in a result. 
3. The alpha significance criterion (α) defines the risk of committing a
Type I error or the probability of incorrectly rejecting a null 
hypothesis. Normally alpha is set at α = .05 or lower and 
statistical tests are assumed to be nondirectional (two-tailed). 
4. Statistical power refers to the chosen or implied Type II error rate (β)
of the test. If an acceptable level of β is .20, then desired power 
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= .80 (or 1 – β).  
The four power parameters are related, meaning the value of any 
parameter can be determined from the other three. (Ellis 2010) 
The program GPower 3.1 used the previously stated parameters with five 
additional ones—Statistical Test, Test Family, Type of Power, Tails, and Number of 
Predictors—to correctly calculate the sample size. See Table 4.1 for the input and output 
of GPower 3.1.  
There are many statistical tests available to researchers; however, linear multiple 
regression was chosen because it “allows the researcher to simultaneously investigate the 
role of multiple influences on an outcome variable” (Hayes 2013). When choosing this 
regression method, the “Test Family” defaults to t-test. This analysis was completed 
before the survey was distributed. Therefore, the option under “Type of Power Analysis” 
requires “A Priori,” which means beforehand.  
 The “Tails” category of the t-test has two options, one-tail or two-tails. Two-tails 
was chosen because “when using a two-tailed test, regardless of the direction of the 
relationship you hypothesize, you are testing for the possibility of the relationship in both 
directions” (UCLA 2016). In other words, “a two-tailed test will test both if the mean is 
significantly greater than x and if the mean significantly less than x” (UCLA 2016). 
 The next three inputs—Effect Size, α err prob, Power (1- β err prob)—are 
previously explained by Ellis. To calculate the “Effect Size,” the variance or R2 was 
needed for each variable. The lowest R2 was be used in GPower 3.1 to ensure that sample 
size will be large enough. The R2 values for each independent variable are as follows; 
compensation R2=0.41 (Bloom and Milkovich 1995), ethics R2=0.134 (Singhapakdi 
1999), and risk tolerance R2=0.86 (Tulloch et al. 2014). Ethics has the smallest R2; 
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therefore, 0.134 was be used to determine the f2 effect size. Ellis also states acceptable 
values for “α err prob” and “Power (1- β err prob)” as 0.05 and 0.8, respectfully. The last 
input, “Number of Predictors”, is the number of independent variables in the survey, 
which in this case was three. GPower 3.1 calculated the minimum sample size to be 82 
participants not the 74 participants that the rule-of-thumb suggested.  
4.2 Survey 
This research project was based on a cross-sectional surveillance of a group of 
mining engineers and consultants. When a survey is used to assess a person’s perception 
of risk, assurance of confidentiality is important because the respondent will be more 
inclined to give truthful responses.  
In designing a survey, it is important to consider how the questions will be 
presented, how many questions will relate to each variable, and then to proceed with the 
creation of the questions themselves. Because this survey was intended to measure 
participants’ perceptions of ethics, compensation, risk tolerance, and normalization of 
deviance, the Likert scale was used. The Likert scale that is usually used has five 
categories that range from: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and 
strongly disagree.  
Research by Shoukri et al. (2004) into the requirements of a reliable study based 
on sample size was used to calculate the number of questions needed for each variable. 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, Sample Size, the minimum sample size for this study was 
82 participants. With help from Professor Brian Baucom in interpreting the tables in 
Shoukri et al. (2004), it was determined that each variable needed a minimum of five 
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questions. 
A literature search determined that of the four variables being tested, only the 
“ethics” variable had been previously assessed by survey. That survey is described by 
Singhapakdi et al. (1996), and is the source for the ethics variable questions used in this 
study. From the 40 questions in that study, six were chosen and then modified to fit the 
mining industry; see Table 4.2.  
Five drafts of the survey questions were considered, as shown in Table 4.3. The 
first draft was written after reading and becoming familiar with the literature. The second 
draft was written after receiving help from Professor Mike Nelson. The last three drafts 
were created while receiving help from Professor Tom Hethmon. After each draft, 
additional reading and studying occurred. It took almost a year from the time that the first 
draft was created to the completion of the final draft. The completed questions can be 
found in Appendix A. 
4.3 Data Collection 
The survey’s distribution and collection was handled by an online service called 
“Survey Monkey.” Those who choose to participate were given four weeks to complete 
the survey. Information concerning the removal of identifying markers was given at the 
beginning of the survey. A copy of the survey as it appeared on Survey Monkey is 
included in Appendix B. 
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members of SME. SME is a large organization whose membership exceeds 15,000. Even 
though the sample size had the potential of being larger than required, and thus better 
reflecting the population of interest, it was difficult to distribute the surveys and achieve a 
strong response rate.  
4.5 Analysis 
The program SPSS was used to run both descriptive and inferential analysis. As 
stated in Chapter 3, the dependent variable in this study was normalization of deviance. 
The independent variables were compensation, ethics, and risk tolerance.  
4.4 Target Group 
The target group was the mining engineers and consultants in the U.S. who are 
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Table 4.1: Power Analysis 
GPower 3.1 
Input Output 
Statistical Test Linear multiple regression: Fixed 




Test Family t-test Actual Power 0.803 
Type of power 
analysis A priori
Tails Two 
Effect size f2  0.0989011 
a err prob 0.05 







Table 4.2: Modified Questions 
Original Ethics Questions Modified Ethics Questions to Fit Mining 
1. Being ethical and social responsible is the most important
thing a firm can do.
1. Being ethical (compliance with rules, regulations,
etc.) is important to operating a successful mine.
2. While output quality is essential to corporate success, ethics
and social responsibility is not.
2. Productivity is essential to a mine’s success, but ethics
are not.
3. A person should make certain that their actions never
intentionally harm another even to a small degree.
3. Mining risks that negatively impact miners should not
be tolerated, regardless of magnitude of the impact.
4. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of
how small the risks might be.
4. What is ethical in one mining company may not be in
another.
5. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most
important concern in any society.
5. If pressured to make a change in a mine design that
would result in an unacceptable level of risk, I would
rather resign than compromise my professional ethics.
6. What is ethical varies from one situation and society to
another.
6. Mining engineers should verify that their designs do
not result in harm to others working in the mine.
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Table 4.3: Creating Risk Tolerance Questions 
First Attempt 
My company/mine has a level for acceptable risk. 
I have a set limit of acceptable risk. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my personal level of acceptable risk. 
I have ignored my level of acceptable risk to proceed with my company’s acceptable risk limit. 
I find that safety factors are the most important element of acceptable risk. 
My company believes that safety factors are the most important element of acceptable risk. 
Second Attempt 
My company/mine has a level for acceptable risk. 
I have a set limit of acceptable risk. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my personal level of acceptable risk. 
I have ignored my level of acceptable risk to proceed with my company’s acceptable risk limit. 
I find that safety factors are the most important element of acceptable risk. 
My company believes that safety factors are the most important element of acceptable risk. 
Third Attempt 
My company/mine has a defined level of acceptable risk. 
Personally, or professionally I have clear understanding of acceptable risk. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my personal level of acceptable risk. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my professional level of acceptable risk. 
I find that factors of safety (e.g. pit design) are the most important element of acceptable risk. 
My company believes that factors of safety (e.g. pit design) are the most important element of 
acceptable risk. 
Fourth Attempt 
My corporation has a defined level of acceptable risk for mining engineering. 
My mine has a defined level of acceptable risk for mining engineering. 
Professionally, I have a clear understanding of acceptable risk in mining. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my personal level of acceptable risk. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my professional level of acceptable risk. 
Factor of safety is the most important parameter of acceptable risk for pit design. 
Finished set of questions 
My mine has a defined level of acceptable risk for mining engineering. 
My company has a defined level of acceptable risk for mining engineering. 
Professionally, I have a clear understanding of acceptable risk in mining. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my personal level of acceptable risk. 
My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my professional level of acceptable risk. 





The responses to the demographic questions in this study were useful in two 
ways. First, they were an easy way to group participants based on gender, experience, and 
so on. Second, they were used to perform a t-test comparison that determined if the 
participants responded differently depending on a certain demographic criterion.   
An overview of the demographic questions and responses follows. Although the 
following data can be seen in Table 5.1, individual demographics are best depicted in 
Figures 5.1-5.8. The first question elicited the participant’s gender as shown in Figure 
5.1, 78 males and 10 Females. The second inquired if the participant earned a 
professional engineering certificate (PE). As shown in Figure 5.2, 38 participants had a 
PE and 50 did not. Because there are many different fields in which a person can obtain a 
PE, question three elicited in which field the PEs were obtained. However, this study was 
to compare the differences in responses from those who had the PE certification and 
those who did not. Therefore, the responses to question three was not used in this 
analysis. The fourth question elicited how many years of experience the participant had 
as an engineer. As shown in Figure 5.3, most of the participants had 20 or more years of 
experience. The fifth question inquired if the participants were or had been operations 
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managers. As shown in Figure 5.4, 15 participants had not been operations managers, 
while most of those who were operations managers had 10 years or less of experience, 
and two-thirds of those had held the position for five years or less. The sixth question 
drew a distinction between surface and underground mining. As shown in Figure 5.5, 
surface mining had 36 responses, underground 26 responses, and 24 worked in both 
surface and underground mines. The seventh and eighth questions elicited which type of 
mineral was mined. Most of the engineers that responded mined metals, as shown in 
Figure 5.6. Because of the variety of answers for question eight, no significant analytical 
work could be conducted. Questions nine, ten, and eleven inquired about the education of 
the participant. Question nine was not analyzed because all the participants had a 
bachelor’s degree. Of the 88 participants, 38 had master’s degrees and 11 had doctorate 
degrees, as seen in Figure 5.7. The last question asked about the participants’ physical 
work locations, with options being corporate offices, division offices, or mine site, or if 
they were consultants. Most of participants said they worked at mine sites or as 
consultants, as seen in Figure 5.8. 
The t-test was used to determine if one demographic responded differently than 
another demographic for a given question. The t-test compared the mean of each variable 
to each participant’s responses to the demographic questions.  For example, the analysis 
showed how each gender perceive ethics:  For males the mean score for ethics was 4.26, 
while for females it was 4.33, as seen in Table 5.1. Unfortunately, the difference between 
these scores was not statistically significant, so correlations or associations cannot be 
confidently stated. The data in Table 5.1, which relate the demographic variables to the 
study’s independent variables, show little if any statistically significant variation in the 
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effects of demographics.  It was thus concluded that none of the demographic variables 
effected how the participants viewed each individual variable. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for variables are as follows: risk tolerance mean was 
2.22, median was 2.20, and mode was 2.00. Risk tolerance had a standard deviation of 
0.594. Compensation had a mean of 2.14, median of 2.00, and mode of 2.00. 
Compensation had a standard deviation of 0.830. Ethics had a mean of 4.27, median of 
4.33, and mode of 4.33. Ethics has a standard deviation of 0.463. Normalization of 
deviance had a mean of 1.82, median of 1.78, and mode of 1.78. Compensation had a 
standard deviation of 0.475 These statistics are summarized in Table 5.2. 
5.3 Inferential Statistics 
5.3.1 Post Power Analysis 
As related in Chapter 4, it was found that this research required a sample size of at 
least 82 participants. To calculate the actual power of the survey GPower 3.1 was again 
used. That analysis is summarized in Table 5.3. The information from Table 4.1 stayed 
the same, with the exception of “Type of Power Analysis.” Instead of using “A Priori,” 
the option “Post Hoc,” which means afterwards, was chosen. By choosing “Post Hoc,” 
the input “Power (1-b err prob)” changed to “Total Sample Size.” At the end of the 
allotted time, 88 people had participated in the survey. Therefore, for this study, the 
actual power was 0.83, as seen in Table 5.3. 
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5.3.2 Cronbach’s Alpha 
Lee Cronbach developed the Alpha test, which assigns a number between zero 
and one to characterize internal consistency or reliability of the test or scale (Tavakol and 
Dennick 2011). The number that is assigned to the test or scale is called the reliability 
coefficient. The closer the reliability coefficient is to one, the stronger the reliability of 
the test, as shown in Figure 5.9. Comparison of Table 5.4 with Figure 5.9 shows that the 
data for this study were mostly poor and questionable, with only one factor 
(normalization of deviance) being consistent and reliable.  
Increasing the number of questions in a group will increase the Alpha coefficient, 
while decreasing that number will decrease it (Tavakol and Dennick 2011). This is why it 
was important to know how many questions are needed for each variable, as discussed in 
Section 4.2. Each of the independent variables—ethics, compensation, and risk 
tolerance—had five or six questions. The dependent variable—normalization of 
deviance—had 18 questions, three times the number of the questions for independent 
variables. Therefore, a high reliability coefficient for normalization of deviance is 
probably the result of the fact that it was measured with more questions than were the 
other variables. 
5.3.3 Correlation 
The first hypothesis was to test the correlation between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable.  
Correlation is a statistical technique that can show whether and how 
strongly pairs of variables are related… Although this correlation is fairly 
obvious your data may contain unsuspected correlations. You may also 
suspect there are correlations, but don't know which are the strongest… A 
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key thing to remember when working with correlations is never to assume 
a correlation means that a change in one variable causes a change in 
another. (The Survey System 2017) 
There are five levels at which variables can correlate with each other: perfect 1.0, high 
1.0 > 0.75, moderate 0.75 ≥ 0.50, low 0.50 ≥ 0.25, and absence of correlation 0.25 > 0.0 
(Statistics Solutions 2016). The data in Table 5.5 show that both “ethics” and 
“compensation” have a moderate degree of correlation with “normalization of deviance,” 
while “risk tolerance” has a low degree of correlation with “normalization of deviance.” 
It is important to note that all correlations were significant, meaning that these 
correlations did not occur by happenstance.  
5.3.4 Linear Regression 
The second hypothesis was to test if there were any significant associations 
between the independent variables and dependent variable. Single linear regression was 
used to test this hypothesis. The third hypothesis test was to determine any significant, 
unique associations between the independent variables and dependent variable. 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to test this third hypothesis.  
5.3.4.1 Single Linear Regression 
Linear regression assesses the linear relationship between two variables, the 
independent variables against the dependent variable separately.  
A linear regression was run to understand the effect of participants’ valuation of 
ethics on normalization of deviance. To visually assess the linearity, a scatterplot of 
normalization of deviance against ethics with a regression line superimposed was 
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prepared. There was a negative linear relationship between the two variables: as ethics 
increased, normalization decreased. As shown in Figure 5.10, valuation of ethics was 
significantly related to normalization of deviance (B=-0.579, β=-0.564, p<0.001)†. For 
every standard deviation unit increase in that valuation, it is expected from the regression 
that normalization of deviance will decrease by 0.564 units. Valuation of ethics explained 
31.8% of variance in normalization of deviance, as seen in Table 5.6. 
A linear regression was also run to understand the effect of level of compensation 
on normalization of deviance. To visually assess the linearity, a scatterplot of 
normalization of deviance against compensation with a regression line superimposed was 
prepared. There was a positive linear relationship between the two variables: as 
compensation increased, normalization also increased. As shown in Figure 5.11, 
compensation was significantly related to normalization of deviance (B=0.296, β=0.518, 
p<0.001). For every standard deviation unit increase in level of compensation, it is 
expected from the regression analysis that normalization of deviance will increase by 
0.518 units. Level of compensation explained 26.9% of variance in normalization of 
deviance; see Table 5.7. 
Finally, a linear regression was run to understand the effect of risk tolerance on 
normalization of deviance. To visually assess the linearity, a scatterplot of normalization 
of deviance against risk tolerance with a regression line superimposed was prepared. 
There was a positive linear relationship between the two variables: as risk tolerance 
increased, normalization also increased. As shown in Figure 5.12, risk tolerance was 
† The difference between “B” and “β”, is “B” denotes the same units of the study, 
whereas “β” denotes standard deviation units. The symbol “p” denotes the level of 
significance.   
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significantly related to normalization of deviance (B=0.366, β=0.458, p<0.001). For 
every standard deviation unit increase in risk tolerance, it is expected that normalization 
of deviance will increase by 0.458 units. Risk tolerance explained 21% of variance in 
normalization of deviance; see Table 5.8.  
5.3.4.2 Hierarchical Regression 
Hierarchical and multiple regression are much alike, because both can explain 
significant, unique associations and variations in the data. However, hierarchical multiple 
regression “has a number of advantages, such as allowing you to: (a) control for the 
effects of covariates on your results; and (b) take into account the possible causal effects 
of independent variables when predicting a dependent variable” (Laerd 2017). The 
following discussion explains the results that are shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. 
In model one, normalization of deviance was regressed onto risk tolerance. Risk 
tolerance was significantly related to normalization of deviance (B=0.366, β=0.458, 
p<0.001). For every standard deviation unit increase in risk tolerance, the regression 
indicated that normalization of deviance will increase by 0.458 units. Risk tolerance 
explained 21% of the variance in normalization of deviance.  
In model two, normalization of deviance was regressed onto both risk tolerance 
and compensation. Risk tolerance (B=0.286, β=0.358, p<0.001) was significantly related 
to normalization of deviance. For every standard deviation unit increase in risk tolerance, 
the regression indicated that normalization of deviance will increase by 0.358. 
Compensation was also significantly related to normalization of deviance (B=0.249, 
β=0.436, p<0.001). For every standard deviation unit increase in compensation, the 
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regression indicated that normalization of deviance will increase by 0.436.  In model two, 
risk tolerance and compensation are both uniquely associated with normalization of 
deviance and explain 37.6% of its variance. The addition of compensation in the 
regression explained unique variance in normalization of deviance above and beyond the 
level of risk tolerance, F-change (1, 85) = 25.11, R-Square Change = 18%, p<0.001. 
In model three, normalization of deviance was regressed onto all three 
independent variables—risk tolerance, compensation, and ethics. Risk tolerance was 
related to normalization of deviance (B=0.226, β=0.283, p<0.001). For every standard 
deviation unit increase in risk tolerance, the regression indicated that normalization of 
deviance will increase by 0.283. Compensation was related to normalization of deviance. 
(B=0.178, β=0.312, p<0.001). For every standard deviation unit increase in 
compensation, the regression indicated that normalization of deviance will increase by 
0.312. Ethics was also significantly related to normalization of deviance (B=-0.369, β=-
0.360, p<0.001). For every standard deviation unit increase in ethics, the regression 
indicated that normalization of deviance will decrease by 0.360. All three independent 
variables are uniquely associated with normalization of deviance and explain 49.9% of its 
variance. However, the addition of ethics explained unique variance in normalization of 
deviance above and beyond the level of risk tolerance and compensation, F-change‡ (1, 
84) = 17.22, R-Square Change§ = 10.4%, p<0.001**.
‡ F-change statistic is a test of whether that amount of additional variance explained is 
significantly different from zero or not. 
§ R-square change explains how much additional variance is accounted for by the
variables added in the model relative to a model that doesn't include it/them.
** p<0.001 shows F-change to be significant.
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D1 Male 78 4.260 2.411 2.202 1.809 Female 10 4.333 2.150 2.360 1.905 
D2 PE 38 4.311 2.236 2.268 1.824 No PE 50 4.236 2.070 2.184 1.816 
D4.1 0-5 18 4.213 2.000 2.144 1.885 
D4.2 6-10 11 4.015 2.772 2.636 2.080 
D4.3 11-15 8 4.333 2.062 2.175 1.750 
D4.4 16-20 4 4.125 1.875 2.550 1.722 
D4.5 20+ 47 4.351 2.085 2.131 1.754 
D5.1 0-5 33 4.171 2.121 2.393 1.862 
D5.2 6-10 17 4.323 2.235 2.129 1.800 
D5.3 11-15 6 4.694 1.416 1.800 1.472 
D5.4 16-20 3 4.333 2.166 2.333 1.777 
D5.5 20+ 14 4.238 2.035 2.128 1.750 
D5.6 N/A 15 4.266 2.467 2.173 1.963 
D6.1 Surface 36 4.231 2.097 2.138 1.756 
D6.2 Underground 26 4.205 2.173 2.292 1.914 
D6.3 Both 24 4.354 2.145 2.250 1.812 
D7.1 Coal 23 4.217 2.239 2.339 1.869 
D7.2 Metal 40 4.204 2.162 2.165 1.818 
D7.3 Non-Metal 14 4.392 1.928 2.157 1.769 
D7.4 Coal and Metal 1 4.000 3.500 3.800 2.944 
D7.5 Metal and Non-Metal 1 4.333 2.000 1.600 1.611 
D7.6 Coal and Non-Metal 4 4.541 1.750 2.550 1.625 
D7.7 Coal and Metal and Non-Metal 5 4.500 2.200 1.840 1.722 
D10 M.S. 38 4.193 2.210 2.342 1.915 No M.S. 50 4.326 2.138 2.128 1.747 
D11 Ph.D. 11 4.333 2.181 2.527 1.853 No Ph.D. 77 4.259 2.136 2.176 1.815 
D12.1 Corporate 9 4.481 1.889 2.111 1.697 
D12.2 Division 7 4.619 1.500 1.971 1.452 
D12.3 Mine 34 4.137 2.235 2.329 1.937 
D12.4 Consultant/Contractor 38 4.271 2.236 2.194 1.811 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation N 
Ethics 4.27 4.33 4.33 0.463 88 
Compensation 2.14 2.00 2.00 0.830 88 
Risk Tolerance 2.22 2.20 2.00 0.594 88 









Table 5.3 Achieved Power 
GPower 3.1 
Input Output 
Test Family t-test 
Actual Power 0.830 
Statistical Test Linear multiple regression: Fixed 
model, single regression 
coefficient 




Effect size f2  0.0989011 
a err prob 0.05   
Total Sample Size 88   








Table 5.4 Cronbach’s Alpha Results 
Variable N Cronbach’s Alpha 
Ethics 88 0.552 
Compensation 88 0.602 
Risk Tolerance 88 0.611 
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Table 5.5 Correlation 
**Correlation is significant at p<0.01 
*Correlation is significant at p<0.05
Ethics C2/C3 Risk Tolerance 
Normalization of 
Deviance 
Ethics Pearson Correlation 1 0.395** 0.289** 0.564** Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.006 0.000 
Compensation 
Question 2 and 3 (C2/C3) 
Pearson Correlation 0.395** 1 0.229* 0.518** Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.032 0.000 
Risk Tolerance Pearson Correlation 0.289** 0.229* 1 0.458** Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 0.032 0.000 
Normalization of 
Deviance 
Pearson Correlation 0.564** 0.518** 0.458** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5.6 Linear Regression Ethics and Normalization of Deviance 
Coefficientsa





t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
Ethics 0.564 0.318 -0.579 0.091 -0.564 -6.338 0.000
a. Dependent Variable: Normalization of Deviance
Table 5.7 Linear Regression Compensation and Normalization of Deviance 
Coefficientsa





t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
Compensation 0.518 0.269 0.296 0.053 0.518 5.620 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Normalization of Deviance
Table 5.8 Linear Regression Risk Tolerance and Normalization of Deviance 
Coefficientsa





t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
Risk Tolerance 0.458 0.210 0.366 0.077 0.458 4.779 0.000 






Table 5.9 Hierarchical Regression Model Summary 
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error 
Change Statistics 































a. Predictor: Risk Tolerance 
b. Predictor: Risk Tolerance, Compensation 














B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part 
1 Risk Tolerance 0.366 0.077 0.458 4.779 0.000 0.458 0.458 0.458 
          
2 Risk Tolerance 0.286 0.070 0.358 4.114 0.000 0.458 0.408 0.349 Compensation 0.249 0.050 0.436 5.012 0.000 0.518 0.478 0.425 
          
3 
Risk Tolerance 0.226 0.065 0.283 3.456 0.001 0.458 0.353 0.268 
Compensation 0.178 0.049 0.312 3.655 0.000 0.518 0.370 0.284 
Ethics -0.369 0.089 -0.360 -4.149 0.000 -0.564 -0.412 -0.322 
a. Dependent Variable: Normalization of Deviance 
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Figure 5.1 Gender Distribution in the Survey Population 
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Source: Adapted from www.statisticshowto.com/cronbachs-alpha-spss/ 








































DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Discussion 
A major goal of this research was obtaining responses from enough participants to 
accurately characterize the mining engineering subculture. Section 4.1, Sample Size, 
stated that this survey required 82 participants to have significant statistical strength of 
0.8. After the appointed time, 88 people had participated in the survey, giving a statistical 
strength score of 0.83.  
To fully understand the results of the t-test and descriptive statistics, a knowledge 
of how the variables were coded was needed. The Likert scale consisted of five 
categories and with each response was given a value from one through five, one being the 
lowest, and five the highest. The anticipated result for ethics was five, meaning that the 
participant had high ethical views. The anticipated result for compensation was one, 
meaning that compensation did not affect the decision of the engineer. The anticipated 
result for risk tolerance was one, meaning that the participant had low tolerance for risk. 
For normalization of deviance, the anticipated result was one, meaning that normalization 
of deviance was not occurring. 
Figures 5.1 through 5.8 depict how the participants responded to the demographic 
questions. The majority of the participants were males working at a mine site or as 
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consultants with 20 plus years of engineering experience. The t-test was used to identify 
any differences in how participants viewed the different variables depending on their 
demographics, as shown in Table 5.1. The analysis found that no statistically significant 
correlation existed between ethics, risk tolerance, or compensation and normalization of 
deviance. 
Descriptive statistics help present data more efficiently, which simplifies 
interpretation. The mean, median, and mode all measure the central tendencies of the 
data. However, depending on the data, one may be more useful than the others. The mean 
is the average score of all the responses. If there are outliers, then the mean score 
becomes an invalid way to depict the central tendency. Listing scores from lowest to 
highest, the median is the middle score. This method is good when there is a large spread 
of data. The mode is the most widely used descriptive statistic (Laerd 2017). The 
standard deviation is also reported to show the spread of the scores. In Table 5.2 it shows 
that the mean scores are slightly skewed from the medians and modes. It was expected 
that the skew for ethics would have increased the mean score closer to five. Instead, the 
outliers decreased the score, meaning that for some participants, the importance of ethics 
was exceptionally low. It was expected that for the variables compensation, risk 
tolerance, and normalization of deviance, the mean scores would have been skewed 
closer to one. Instead, for each of those variables, the score was increased closer to five. 
This could indicate that the outliers are really the true responses to the survey; however, 
further research is required to understand this effect. 
Cronbach’s alpha was used to verify the reliability of the questions. For these 
data, the alpha scores for ethics (0.552), compensation (0.602), risk tolerance (0.611), and 
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normalization of deviance (0.885) are all within a range that indicates the questions are 
reliable. This meant that the data could be processed further using linear regression.  
Once it was established that the variables were reliable, the first hypothesis could 
be tested. That hypothesis reads; 
H1: There is a correlation between ethics, compensation, acceptable risk, and 
normalization of deviance. 
There were significant correlations between each independent variable and the dependent 
variable. Additionally, there were significant correlations between the respective 
independent variables, as seen in Table 5.5. Significant correlations tell the researcher 
that the correlations are not occurring by accident. The first hypothesis is accepted as 
true, because there were significant correlations between the independent variables and 
dependent variable.  
After significant correlations were determined, individual linear regressions could 
be performed to determine the relation of the independent variables to the dependent 
variable. The second hypothesis was separated into three sub-hypotheses, thus:  
H2a: There is a negative association between ethical behavior and normalization 
of deviance. 
H2b: There is a positive association between compensation and normalization of 
deviance. 
H2c: There is a positive association between risk tolerance and normalization of 
deviance. 
Hypothesis 2a was found to be true. There was a significant negative association 
between ethics and normalization of deviance (B=-0.579, β=-0.564, p<0.001), as shown 
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in Figure 5.10. Hypothesis 2b was also found to be true. There was a significant positive 
association between compensation and normalization of deviance (B=0.296, β=0.518, 
p<0.001), as shown in Figure 5.11. Lastly, hypothesis 2c was found to be true. There was 
a significant positive association between risk tolerance and normalization of deviance 
(B=0.366, β=0.458, p<0.001), as shown in Figure 5.12.  
Each of the independent variables individually had a significant association with 
the dependent variable. The third hypothesis evaluated by testing the independent 
variables together against the dependent variable. The third hypothesis was separated into 
three sub-hypotheses, to determine if one or more independent variables were 
significantly, uniquely associated with the dependent variable. 
H3a: Ethics is significantly, uniquely associated with and accounts for additional 
unique variance in normalization of deviance. 
H3b: Compensation is significantly, uniquely associated with and accounts for 
additional unique variance in normalization of deviance. 
H3c: Risk tolerance is significantly, uniquely associated with and accounts for 
additional unique variance in normalization of deviance. 
Hypothesis 3a was found to be true. Ethics had a negative significant, unique 
association with normalization of deviance (B=-0.369, β=-0.360, p<0.001) and accounted 
for additional unique variance, R-Square Change = 10.4%. As personal ethics increased, 
the likelihood for normalization of deviance decreased. Hypothesis 3b was found to be 
true. Compensation had a positive significant, unique association with normalization of 
deviance (B=0.178, β=0.312, p<0.001) and accounted for additional unique variance, R-
Square Change = 8.1%. As compensation was given contingency on a showing of no 
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safety issues increased, it was more likely for normalization of deviance to also increase. 
Hypothesis 3c was found to be true. Risk Tolerance was significantly and uniquely 
associated to normalization of deviance (B=0.226, β=0.283, p<0.001) and accounted for 
additional unique variance, R-Square Change = 7.1%. The more the participant was 
willing to tolerate risk, the more likely normalization of deviance would increase.  
6.2 Conclusions 
The effects of ethics, compensation, and risk tolerance on normalization of 
deviance may have seemed obvious. However, those effects have never been addressed 
or tested in the mining industry. Steve Gardner, president of SME, stated in 2016 that the 
SME organization recognized that normalization of deviance is occurring in the mining 
industry (Gardner 2016). While this research has not shown that normalization of 
deviance is occurring within the mining industry, it has confirmed the existence of 
normalization of deviance within the subculture of mining engineers. That is why this 
research is important: it has exposed normalization of deviance to be a real issue in the 
mining industry.  
The independent variables studied here, ethics, compensation, and risk tolerance, 
do correlate with normalization of deviance. The data reveal that as normalization of 
deviance occurs, there are changes in these independent variables and that these changes 
are not random occurrences. Just because there is a correlation does not signify that there 
is also an association between the independent variables and dependent variable. The 
linear regression method was used to test the relationship of each independent variable 
separately with the dependent variable to determine if an association existed. The data 
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showed that as ethical behavior decreased, normalization of deviance increased and that 
as compensation and risk tolerance increased, normalization of deviance increased. The 
last step was to test all variables that had significant associations together against the 
dependent variable. By testing all the variables together, it was found that all three of the 
independent variables were significantly and uniquely associated with the dependent 
variable. Because ethics, compensation, and risk tolerance are each uniquely associated 
with normalization of deviance, it is possible to predict normalization of deviance among 
mining engineers. 
6.3 Limitations and Recommendations 
A few limitations were encountered while proceeding with this research. First was 
the first public survey measuring the different factors of ethics, compensation, and risk 
tolerance and how those factors interacted with normalization of deviance in the mining 
industry. Second, after corresponding with Diane Vaughan, who discovered 
normalization of deviance, it was discovered that this survey was the first to measure 
normalization of deviance (D. Vaughan, personal communication). Previously, 
measuring normalization of deviance was evaluated by interpreting interviews. These 
first two limitations are important in that there was no previous research or templates to 
follow for this study. Third, the expected response rate, 10%, was not as high as 
expected. Two separate links to the survey were posted to the SME community website 
and the SME LinkedIn. For the SME community, the response rate was 2.9%. For SME 
on LinkedIn, a response rate could not be calculated because no one responded to the 
request. After posting the links on the websites, it was impossible to ensure that everyone 
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who visited the site saw the post asking for mining engineers to take the survey. Finally, a 
basic knowledge and importance of a test group for creating a survey was known, but the 
reality of this important step was not fully understood in the beginning. The test group for 
this survey consisted of faculty and graduate students in the mining engineering 
department at the University of Utah. The test group should have included all the 
undergraduates as well, which would have increased and diversified the test group. If the 
test group had been larger the issue of dichotomous questions within the variable, 
“compensation” would have been recognized and changed to accommodate a continuous 
scale.  
Further research is needed to understand normalization of deviance. Research 
could focus on causation of normalization of deviance in the mining industry. It could 
also focus on which training methods or interventions can most effectively counter 












E1 + 1. Being ethical (compliance with rules, regulations, etc.) is important to operating a successful mine. 55 
E2 - 2. Productivity is essential to a mine’s success, but ethics are not. 37 
E3 + 3. Mining risks that negatively impact miners should not be tolerated, regardless of magnitude of the impact. 39 
E4 - 4. What is ethical in one mining company may not be in another. 40 
E5 + 
5. If pressured to make a change in a mine design that would result in an 
unacceptable level of risk, I would rather resign than compromise my 
professional ethics. 
41 
E6 + 6. Mining engineers should verify that their designs do not result in harm to others working in the mine. 48 
Compensation 
C1 Yes /No 
7. My mine has a bonus or incentive plan.  
8. My company has a bonus or incentive plan. 
23 
24 
C2 - 9. Receiving a safety bonus has led to under-reporting of safety incidents in my company. 42 
C3 - 10. Taking risks for financial incentive is acceptable at my mine. 11. Taking risks for financial incentive is acceptable in my company. 
19 
20 
C4 Yes /No 
12. At my mine, bonus/incentive plans are partly based on safety 
performance. 




C5 Yes /No 
14. At my mine, bonus and/or incentive plans are partly based on 
production performance.  







16. My mine has a defined level of acceptable risk for mining engineering. 




RT2 + 18. Professionally, I have a clear understanding of acceptable risk in mining. 44 
RT3 - 19. My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my personal level of acceptable risk. 45 
RT4 - 20. My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my professional level of acceptable risk. 46 
RT5 + 21. Factor of safety is the most important parameter of acceptable risk for pit design, tunnel design, or roof control. 49 
Normalization of Deviance 
ND1 - 22. It is personally acceptable to me to cut corners provided the task is accomplished.  50 
ND2 + 
23. My mine always adheres to safety standards during mine operations. 




ND3 - 25. Personnel at my mine sometimes depart from standard operating procedures (SOPs) to get the job done. 51 
ND4 - 26. My mine has not always adhered to factors of safety so that the job can get done. 57 




28. My mine has not always complied with regulations so that I can get the 
job done. 
29. My company has not always complied with regulations so that they can 




ND7 - 30. I have not always fully completed the designated SOPs so that I can finish a task more efficiently.  53 
ND8 - 
31. At my mine it is acceptable to lower safety standards to optimize 
production. 




ND9 - 33. I have not always complied with regulations so that I can get the job done. 54 
ND10 - 34. If there are no negative consequences when I fail to comply with MSHA regulations, my actions are justified. 43 
ND11 - 35. If there are no negative consequences for not adhering to good engineering design, my actions are justified. 47 
ND12 - 36. If there are no negative consequences for not following SOPs, my actions are justified. 56 
ND13 - 37. If there are no related negative consequences, I do not feel a need to comply with regulations. 58 
ND14 - 38. If there are no negative consequences, I do not have to follow the designated SOPs. 59 
ND15 - 39. If there are no related negative consequences, I do not feel obligated to adhere to good engineering design. 38 




42. My mine always applies high safety standards when modifying mine 
designs for economic or market reasons. 
43. My company always applies high safety standards when modifying 






44. My mine always adheres to good engineering practice when modifying 
mine designs for economic or market reasons. 
45. My company always adheres to good engineering practice when 










Introduction: This survey is part of a graduate student's research project assessing 
professional engineering practices in the mining industry inside the United States. This 
research will be used to improve engineering standards as it applies to mining. This 
survey is confidential—please do not include your name. Honesty and transparency are 
essential to the integrity and accuracy of this research. Thank you for your cooperation. 
 
Questions that have an asterisk require an answer. However, if for any reason you no 
longer wish to participate you may click on the exit button located in the top-right corner 
of the survey.  
 
46. I understand that this survey is confidential and if I feel uncomfortable or no 
longer wish to participate I can click on the exit button located in the top-right 
corner of the survey. 
a. Yes   
b. No 
47. I understand that I can contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) if I have 
questions regarding my rights as a research participant. Also, I can contact the 
IRB if I have questions, complaints or concerns which I feel that I cannot discuss 
with the investigator. (Graduate student) The University of Utah IRB may be 
reached by phone at (801) 581-3655 or by email at irb@hsc.utah.edu. 
I can also contact the Research Participant Advocate (RPA) by phone at (801) 











48. I am.   
a. Male 
b. Female  
3 
D2 





50. My PE license(s) is/are in the following engineering discipline(s): 
a. Chemical 
b. Civil 
c. Control Systems 
d. Electrical and Computer 
e. Environmental 
f. Fire Protection 
g. Industrial and Systems 
h. Mechanical 
i. Metallurgical and Materials 
j. Mining and Mineral Processing 







51. Years of experience as an engineer. 
a. 0-5 
b. 6-10 
c. 11-15  














53. The mine in which I work has…
a. Surface Operations
b. Underground Operations
c. Both Surface and Underground Operations
8 
D7 




















56. I have a bachelor’s degree in…
a. Mining Engineering












57. I have a master’s degree in…
a. Mining Engineering















58. I have a PhD in… 
a. Mining Engineering 
b. Materials Science and Engineering 
c. Chemical Engineering 
d. Mechanical Engineering 
e. Civil Engineering 
f. Environmental Engineering 
g. Electrical Engineering 
h. Petroleum Engineering  
i. Geology 





59. My primary work location is at a… 
a. Cooperate Office 
b. Division/Regional Office 
c. Mine 



































  71 
On “Survey Monkey” I am able to apply logic to certain answers. This survey contains three such logic chains, the first chain includes 
the first two questions of the survey. If the participant were to answer no on either of those questions, then they will not be able to 
continue taking the survey. The second chain is question four, if they answer yes then they can answer question five. However, if they 
answer no then they will skip question five and go to question six. The last chain is question 14, if they answer “Mine” then follow the 
asterisk. If they choose any of the other three choices follow the double asterisk. Each chain ends on question 37 where both combine 
again and the participants can finish completing the survey. The survey takes about 20 minutes to complete.  
 
Introduction: This survey is part of a graduate student's research project assessing professional engineering practices in the mining industry 
inside the United States. This research will be used to improve engineering standards as it applies to mining. This survey is confidential—
please do not include your name. Honesty and transparency are essential to the integrity and accuracy of this research. Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
 
1. I understand that this survey is confidential and if I feel uncomfortable or no longer wish to participate I can click on the exit button 
located in the top-right corner of the survey. 
  Yes   
  No 
2. I understand that I can contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) if I have questions regarding my rights as a research participant. 
Also, I can contact the IRB if I have questions, complaints or concerns which I feel that I cannot discuss with the investigator. (Graduate 
student) The University of Utah IRB may be reached by phone at (801) 581-3655 or by email at irb@hsc.utah.edu. 
I can also contact the Research Participant Advocate (RPA) by phone at (801) 581-3803 or by email at 
participant.advocate@hsc.utah.edu. 
  Yes   
  No 
Demographics 
3. I am…  
  Male   
  Female  
4. I have at least one Professional Engineering (PE) license.   
  Yes   
  No 
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5. My PE license(s) is/are in the following engineering discipline(s):
  Chemical 
  Civil 
  Control Systems 
  Electrical and Computer 
  Environmental 
  Fire Protection 
  Industrial and Systems 
  Mechanical 
  Metallurgical and Materials 


















8. The mine in which I work has…
  Surface operations 
  Underground operations 
  Both surface and underground operations 
  
 
  73 
9. The industry sector I currently work in is…  
  Coal   
  Metal   
  Non-metal 
10. The primary commodity I associate with in my work is…  
  Thermal coal  
  Metallurgical coal  
  Silver  
  Gold  
  Copper  
  Trona  
  Phosphate  
  Salt  
  Iron ore 
  Platinum Group Metals (PGM)  
  Other 
11. I have a bachelor’s degree in… 
  Mining Engineering 
  Materials Science and Engineering 
  Chemical Engineering 
  Mechanical Engineering 
  Civil Engineering 
  Environmental Engineering 
  Electrical Engineering 
  Petroleum Engineering 
  Geology 
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12. I have a master’s degree in… 
  Mining Engineering 
  Materials Science and Engineering 
  Chemical Engineering 
  Mechanical Engineering 
  Civil Engineering 
  Environmental Engineering 
  Electrical Engineering 
  Petroleum Engineering 
  Geology 
  Geological Engineering 
  Other  
  N/A 
13. I have a Ph.D. in… 
  Mining Engineering 
  Materials Science and Engineering 
  Chemical Engineering 
  Mechanical Engineering 
  Civil Engineering 
  Environmental Engineering 
  Electrical Engineering 
  Petroleum Engineering 
  Geology 
  Geological Engineering 
  Other  
  N/A 
14. My primary work location is at a… 
  Corporate office  
  Division office  
  Mine  
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15. *My mine always complies with MSHA regulations. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
16. **My company always complies with MSHA regulations. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
17. *At my mine it is acceptable to lower factors of safety to optimize production. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
18. **At my company it is acceptable to lower factors of safety to optimize production. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
19. *Taking risks for financial incentive is acceptable at my mine. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
20. **Taking risks for financial incentive is acceptable in my company. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
21. *My mine always applies high safety standards when modifying mine designs for economic or market reasons. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
22. **My company always applies high safety standards when modifying mine designs for economic or market reasons. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
23. *My mine has a bonus or incentive plan. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
24. **My company has a bonus or incentive plan. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
25. *At my mine, bonus/incentive plans are partly based on safety performance. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
26. **In my company, bonus/incentive plans are partly based on safety performance. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
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27. *My mine has a defined level of acceptable risk for mining engineering.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
28. **My company has a defined level of acceptable risk for mining engineering.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
29. *At my mine, bonus/incentive plans are partly based on production performance.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
30. **In my company, bonus/incentive plans are partly based on production performance.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
31. *My mine has not always complied with regulations so that I can get the job done.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
32. **My company has not always complied with regulations so that they can get the job done.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
33. *My mine always adheres to safety standards during mine operations.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
34. **My company always adheres to safety standards during mine operations.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
35. *My mine always adheres to good engineering practice when modifying mine design for economic or market reasons.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
36. **My company always adheres to good engineering practice when modifying mine design for economic or market reasons.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
37. Productivity is essential to a mine’s success, but ethics are not.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
38. If there are no related negative consequences, I do not feel obligated to adhere to good engineering design.
  Strongly Agree    Agree    Neither Agree nor Disagree    Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
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39. Mining risks that negatively impact miners should not be tolerated, regardless of magnitude of the impact. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
40. What is ethical in one mining company may not be in another. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
41. If pressured to make a change in a mine design that would result in an unacceptable level of risk, I would rather resign than 
compromise my professional ethics. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
42. Receiving a safety bonus has led to under-reporting of safety incidents in my company. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
43. If there are no negative consequences when I fail to comply with MSHA regulations, my actions are justified. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
44. Professionally, I have a clear understanding of acceptable risk in mining. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
45. My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my personal level of acceptable risk. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
46. My company’s level of acceptable risk conflicts with my professional level of acceptable risk. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
47. If there are no negative consequences for not adhering to good engineering design, my actions are justified. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
48. Mining engineers should verify that their designs do not result in harm to others working in the mine. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
49. Factor of safety is the most important parameter of acceptable risk for pit design, tunnel design, or roof control. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
50. It is personally acceptable to me to cut corners provided the task is accomplished.  
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
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51. Personnel at my mine sometimes depart from standard operating procedures (SOPs) to get the job done. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
52. My mine has always adhered to factors of safety during mine design. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
53. I have not always fully completed the designated SOPs so that I can finish a task more efficiently.  
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
54. I have not always complied with regulations so that I can get the job done. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
55. Being ethical (compliance with rules, regulations, etc.) is important to operating a successful mine. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
56. If there are no negative consequences for not following SOPs, my actions are justified. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
57. My mine has not always adhered to factors of safety so that the job can get done. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
58. If there are no related negative consequences, I do not feel a need to comply with regulations. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
59. If there are no negative consequences, I do not have to follow the designated SOPs. 
  Strongly Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree nor Disagree                      Disagree                      Strongly Disagree 
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